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T

he transatlantic disagreement over how to deal with the regime of
Saddam Hussein in 2003 gave rise to a spate of warnings about the imminent demise of NATO.1 To some extent it is easy to discount many of those
predictions based on the endurance of the alliance and its ongoing expansion.
But there is an underlying concern that should not be ignored: The original
mission of the alliance disappeared 15 years ago and nothing has completely
taken its place. Throughout the Cold War, NATO was seen as absolutely essential to the core security interests of its members. Regardless of the disagreement, nothing undermined the fundamental necessity of the alliance.
That has not always been the case for the past 15 years. NATO is still
a vital alliance with unique capabilities, and although it is involved in stabilization operations from the Balkans to Afghanistan, those missions are generally not viewed as essential to the core security interests of its members. If
they were, the political and military leaders of NATO would not have to shuttle between European capitals begging for a few more helicopters and combat
forces to be deployed beyond Kabul, nor would members of the US Congress
muse openly about a rapid withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan.
Yet, perhaps those missions should be seen as central to American and European common security given the interests underscored in the European Security Strategy and the National Security Strategy of the United States. Both
documents outline similar threats and emphasize the importance of alleviating the underlying causes of instability in the developing world. NATO memWinter 2007-08
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ber militaries are often said to be in the process of transformation, but perhaps
it is time to consider transforming NATO itself into an institution capable of
coordinating the range of assets and capabilities required to perform stabilization and democratization missions likely in the coming decades.
Doing so would make NATO the coordination point for long-term stabilization and democratization missions involving a broad range of military,
paramilitary, and civilian capabilities. Adding this capability would involve
creating deployable modules of different types of forces and capabilities.
These organizations would range from military units to legal and civil administration experts capable of assisting in the creation and management of institutions vital to the promotion of long-term stability and development. This would
be a radical change for the alliance, but it would refocus NATO on the issues
that both sides of the transatlantic alliance recognize as central to their mutual
security. It would also do so in a way that gives more weight to the civilian and
paramilitary capabilities that Europe brings to the table, thus creating a more
balanced alliance with a common purpose.
This article explores why and how this could be accomplished by focusing on the interests and capabilities of the members of the transatlantic alliance. First, it compares the European and American strategy documents.
Despite the tendency to focus on the differences, there are points of commonality that indicate broad agreement on the challenges and necessary responses. Second, it examines how European and American strengths could be
combined to produce robust long-term stabilization and democratization
missions. Third, it will argue that it is in the interests of both the United States
and Europe to reconstitute the transatlantic alliance around stabilization and
democratization missions within the institutional framework of NATO.

US and European Security Strategies
Since 2001 diverging threat perceptions between much of Europe and
the United States have become increasingly clear, but there are still some rather
strong similarities. The European Security Strategy (ESS) and the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) both highlight the critical intersection
of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, state failure, and the danger of regional conflict.2 Both strategies note the unreliability of a defensive posture with
the ESS citing that “the first line of defense will often be abroad,”3 and the NSS
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finding that the United States “cannot rely solely on deterrence to keep terrorists
at bay.”4 Both documents emphasize the security imperative inherent in alleviating global poverty. The ESS notes that “poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns.”5 The NSS stresses that “helping
the world’s poor is a strategic priority and a moral imperative.”6
The two documents also outline a similar range of policy instruments
that can be used to implement the respective strategies. The ESS states, “Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military, and other means. In failed states, military means may be needed to restore
order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis.”7 The NSS speaks of
harnessing “the tools of economic assistance, development aid, trade, and good
governance,” which befits a document that is mainly devoted to nonmilitary
aspects of security.8 Both strategies stress the importance of the transatlantic alliance as a forum for coping with those threats. The ESS identifies this forum as
“one of the core elements of the international system” and singles out NATO as
“an important expression of this relationship.”9 The NSS finds that NATO “remains a vital pillar of US foreign policy” and that it is “an instrument of peace
and stability in many parts of the world.”10
Thus, there is some broad agreement on both the threats and the tools
that can and should be employed to counter them. What most of these threats
share are common root causes: the lack of functioning governmental institutions, rule of law, and democratic governance that is common across broad parts
of the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. It is likely in the coming years that
considerable effort will be expended by both Europe and the United States on
various stabilization and democratization missions in a number of failed or failing states. There are many observers who are justifiably skeptical of the utility of
such missions given the record associated with state-building efforts since 1990.
However, the fact that such missions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans have either failed or achieved much less than what was expected is arguably grounds for
refining and redoubling those efforts rather than prejudging future missions to be
failures. The fact remains that the range of threats identified in the ESS and NSS
are rooted in the fallout from failed and failing states; states where the United
States and Europe will likely be asked to support stabilization and democratization missions in the future. It is fair to question if such missions should be attempted in the first place, but given the inevitable political pressures to “do
something,” perhaps it is more productive to consider how they might be better
performed.
The key issue for successful stabilization and democratization missions, however, is the building of institutions on which a sustainable democracy
can be developed. Democratization can only succeed in conjunction with the development of solid governmental institutions. Without this coordination the proWinter 2007-08
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cess of democratization risks becoming an exercise in “one man-one vote-one
time” or a series of moves into and out of autocratic rule. With stronger institutions premised on the rule of law it may be possible to establish the basis on
which economic and democratic development can take place over the long-term.
It can be argued that stabilization and democratization are completely
separate issues. In fact, one of the notable differences between the European Security Strategy and National Security Strategy of the United States is that only
the latter emphasizes the importance of democratic institutions. Critics of the
current attempts at democratization are correct in pointing out the problems
associated with establishing an electoral democracy before building the underlying liberal foundations. While it is possible to separate stabilization and reconstruction from democratization on a conceptual level, they are intimately
connected in practice. First, it is highly unlikely that stabilization missions
whose sole accomplishment is to leave in place a dictatorial system will be successful in maintaining the necessary long-term popular support in the United
States and Europe for such missions. Second, the number of democratic states in
the world has expanded dramatically since the end of the Cold War to encompass
not just the developed world but also states once thought to be too underdeveloped to sustain democratic principles. Democracy is broadly viewed as the only
legitimate form of governance in the current strategic environment because
there is little else to compete with it. If democracy has a competitor it may be the
political Islamist movements that seek to impose religious law over secular authority. Such movements have limited worldwide appeal, and even in Muslim
countries that appeal is very limited, according to recent surveys.11 The broad appeal of democracy is recognized by autocratic regimes eager to gain the appearance of democratic legitimacy. As Fareed Zakaria notes, “When the enemies of
democracy mouth its rhetoric and ape its rituals, you know it has won the war.”12
In short, stabilization can exist as a separate concept from democratization, but
this distinction cannot be maintained in the long-term as the foundation upon
which to build a successful political policy.
This is not to imply that there is anything simple or inexorable about
stabilization or democratization. To the contrary, they are extremely complex
goals and attempts to make progress on either front will be costly and time consuming. Nor should we ignore the differences between European and American
perceptions of the threats facing their societies and how best to counter them.
Nevertheless, both sides of the transatlantic alliance place considerable emphasis on similar challenges and the tools required to successfully confront them.

The Nature of the Security Challenge
As detailed in the European Security Strategy and the National Security Strategy of the United States, many of the anticipated threats to both
88
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Europe and North America in the coming decades will originate in failed or
failing states. Mass illegal immigration to Europe is mainly a product of state
failure across a broad swath of Africa. Weak and failed states such as Somalia
provide ungoverned space where terrorists can train for attacks on western
targets. The dangers associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is particularly acute across a range of failed and failing states from
Pakistan to North Korea. Narcotics production and trafficking is in part a byproduct of the inability of states to exercise control over their national territory, or in some instances to prevent the control of much of the national
territory by criminals and terrorists.
None of those problems are likely to fade with time; in fact, most are
likely to grow. If the most dire predictions regarding climate change come to
pass, the environmental pressures on Africa in particular could spark even
higher levels of illegal immigration. Environmental pressures could also lead to
increased civil unrest and the collapse of state authority in already weakened
states, increasing the ungoverned spaces in which terrorist organizations thrive.
The obvious solution is to assist in building and strengthening state
institutions in failed or failing states in an effort to arrest their decline into dismal places for their inhabitants to live, while at the same time negating the
possibility of broader threats to regional and global security. As already
noted, the history of state-building is not terribly encouraging, and many, if
not most, efforts end with the accomplishment of far less than what was originally desired. Nevertheless, it is possible to improve the functioning of the
government in failing states. The key is building and improving state capacity. Doing so involves a broad range of assets and skills resident in both North
America and Europe. Many, if not most, of the skills required will be civilian
in nature, but the military will play a critical role in providing the security and
logistics that will permit civilian state-building to take root.
State-building should focus on improving the capacity of the state to
create the foundation on which private enterprise can thrive. The key factor is
rule of law, encompassing a variety of issues. The provision for security is critical; citizens must feel that they can travel and gather with some reasonable assurance that they will not be set upon. Bureaucracies need to be able to operate
free of endemic corruption and burdensome regulation. Few businesses will be
created, at least legally, if the processes associated with registration and establishment are too onerous. The enforceability of contracts is another key factor
requiring a civil legal infrastructure. The list goes on, but what is clear is that
much of what needs to be done falls outside of the traditional functions of the
military. Military force plays a necessary but not all-inclusive role. It can create
the conditions in which state-building can take place, but it cannot replace the
civilian expertise needed to set a failing state on the path to lasting stability.
Winter 2007-08
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This point has been emphasized by military personnel with recent experience
in Afghanistan and Iraq, most notably General David Petraeus, and it is highlighted in the new US Army counterinsurgency manual.
As Francis Fukuyama has pointed out, in the 1980s the international
development community may have put too much emphasis on forcing aid recipients to minimize the impact of the state and free the economy to market forces.13
In theory this liberal approach to development can produce desired outcomes,
but in practice it often produces undesired results. Often aid recipients reduced
spending on precisely the aspects of the state needed to provide the appropriate
level of governance and increased spending on the aspects that benefited the executive. The question, therefore, is how to reduce the excess scope of the state
while at the same time increasing its strength and ability to provide the critical
public services necessary to sustained development. This means emphasizing
the areas where the state has exclusive competency, such as providing security
and ensuring the rule of law. At the same time there is a need to restrain bureaucratic growth and the overly burdensome intrusion into other aspects of a particular society, which in some cases can become a source of corruption and
counterproductive to the development of a stable government. Thus, it is possible, and in fact necessary, to reduce the scope of the state while increasing its
strength and ability to provide fundamental public services.
The need to intervene in failed and failing states is recognized on
both sides of the Atlantic, although the current discourse puts more emphasis
on the differences rather than the similarities. On the American side the emphasis appears to be on military intervention and regime change, although
this is an incomplete characterization given the large investment by the
United States in state capacity-building in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other developing countries. In Europe the emphasis is on the “soft” aspects of security
and foreign policy, although Europe has somewhat more military capability
than is commonly assumed.
It is true that Europe spends far less on defense than the United States
and has far fewer deployable forces. But do not overlook Europe’s significant
military capabilities, for they represent the bulk of deployable military power in
the world compatible with the US military, thanks to the NATO standardization
process. It is worth recalling that the vast majority of the approximately
30,000-strong International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the
16,000-strong NATO force in Kosovo are from NATO member militaries other
than the United States. America spends vastly more on defense than its NATO
partners and has done so since the beginning of the alliance, but the third, fifth,
sixth, and seventh top spenders on defense in the world are NATO members.
There are signs that Europe is developing the ability to deploy and
sustain small but significant military forces in challenging environments.
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Progress in strategic airlift and sealift could give the European members of
NATO the ability to move their forces with less direct support from the United
States. Recent lease agreements for the use of Ukrainian Antonov 124-100
commercial aircraft will provide Canadian and European militaries increased
reach as well.14 European countries are investing in a number of command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.15 If properly leveraged, those developments could allow
European states as individuals or the European Union as a collective body to
project a greater number of sustainable military forces in the near future.
At the same time, the United States has far more capability in civilian
agencies than is generally acknowledged. A National Security Presidential Directive issued in 2005 created the position of Coordinator for Stabilization and
Reconstruction at the State Department reporting directly to the Secretary of
State. It is an interagency office with personnel drawn from the intelligence
community, Agency for International Development, and Departments of Defense, Treasury, and Justice. Pursuant to legislative efforts led by Senators
Richard G. Lugar and Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and Representative David Dreier,
the State Department is working to build a civilian reserve program that would
be able to deploy civilian experts in various specializations required for stabilization missions. At the moment the plan calls for the creation of a core of several hundred personnel with a reserve of an additional 500 personnel. Given the
thousands of judges, prosecutors, and others who could be available for rule of
law missions alone, the United States is a major source for civilian personnel
that could be called upon to support stabilization and reconstruction missions.
There is room for specialization, but this does not suggest a relationship where the United States provides only “hard” security and Europe supplies
the “soft” aspects of stabilization. What should be increasingly clear is that there
is reason to view all aspects of intervention as important given that achieving the
ultimate goal requires a closely managed program involving both military and
civilian capabilities. It should also be apparent that Europe and the United States
are working to develop both hard and soft capabilities better suited to addressing
the particular demands of long-term stabilization missions. The question remains, however, if the two sides can transcend Robert Kagan’s “Europeans are
from Venus and Americans are from Mars” characterization and renew the transatlantic security partnership on a more balanced basis.

Working Together?
Both the United States and Europe would benefit from reconstituting the transatlantic partnership. For the United States, Europe provides considerably more deployable military and civilian personnel vital to the success
of long-term stabilization missions than is generally believed. For Europe, a
Winter 2007-08
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renewed partnership with the United States brings access to resources and
personnel that Europe is hard pressed to provide given its demographic trends
that require devoting increasingly larger proportions of national wealth to
support its aging population.
The United States is likely to need European assistance in future stabilization and democratization missions for political and practical reasons. The
political benefits are obvious, although the complexity of coordinating policy
and specific actions across the alliance is daunting. NATO members agreed, for
example, to the military action in Kosovo, but disagreements over the type and
level of involvement necessary led to claims by military leaders that the conflict was prolonged by political interests.16 Operations conducted with a
smaller number of partners are less likely to experience similar problems.
Those considerations need to be balanced against the fact that more
rather than fewer partners may be necessary as operations are extended into several rotations that may involve tens of thousands of personnel. It was one thing,
for example, to keep the coalition restricted in the initial phase of operations in
Afghanistan. The logistical challenges of getting a force into a landlocked country far from any US base were daunting enough for the American military alone
without attempting to coordinate and assist with the deployments of large numbers of allies. But the follow-on that began in 2002 and continues today requires
a large coalition of forces. The mission spans the range of capabilities from the
military to the purely civilian. There is a real practical need for the United States
to find partners for stabilization and state capacity-building among its European
allies because that is where most capability for this sort of support exists.
Establishing a rule of law mission, for example, will require judicial,
law enforcement, and other specialized personnel who can work under the basic security umbrella formed by a military intervention. Those civilian personnel will have to be maintained in place for several years at a minimum, and even
for a relatively small country this could involve several thousand individuals at
any one time. Therefore, a pool of tens of thousands of deployable nonmilitary
personnel will be required for more than one of these missions. No single country, not even the United States, currently has the resources to do this on its own.
European countries also bring something else to the mix that fills the
critical gap between military and civilian capabilities. Several European nations have deployable paramilitary police forces that are a mixture of light infantry and police forces. They are trained for police activities in a manner that
almost no military personnel are. These forces are relatively heavily armed
when compared with other police forces and can be fitted into the military
chain of command. The United States does not have such a force at its disposal.
Recent developments could make European paramilitary forces
even more relevant in future missions. The European Gendarmerie Force
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(EGF) was created in 2004 with the participation of France, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, and the Netherlands. The five contributing member states are all
NATO members, and they have announced that the EGF could be made available to other international organizations, including NATO.17 Although still a
small force the EGF might serve as a prototype for future forces most needed
in situations where traditional military units are inappropriate.
So the United States needs Europe, but does Europe need the United
States? A glance at the annual Failed States Index published by the Fund for
Peace in Foreign Policy shows that Europe is cradled in a band of failed or
failing states to its south and east. 18 Europe will likely bear the brunt of the
consequences of state failure or inadequacy in terms of massive illegal immigration, organized crime, and terrorist activity. It could attempt to implement
a unilateral strategy to secure its borders from such threats, but a more productive path would be to restructure the transatlantic alliance such that it is
more capable of addressing these common threats.
Several recent books, however, argue that Europe is increasingly capable of providing an alternative model of international engagement based on
“soft” power. These works allude to the proposition that this model will prove
to be a more effective form of international influence than reliance on the
“hard” power of the United States. This belief is founded on the premise that a
more sustainable European economic model will eventually give rise to a European superpower.19 While the United States overextends itself in counterproductive military engagements, Europe will be able to build a more secure
international environment based on its ability to offer developmental assistance, trade incentives, and stabilization and reconstruction through the utilization of its deployable civilian and military personnel.
These predictions are unlikely to materialize. Contrary to those who
envisage the European Union as becoming some sort of counterweight to the
United States in international affairs, Europe will likely grow weaker, not
stronger, over time as an independent player in the international affairs arena.
This will occur in both absolute and relative terms compared to the United
States for the simple reason that the resources and personnel needed to exercise
greater influence in the world are diminishing across the European theater.
These trends are driven by a demographic shift with profound consequences. The economic consequences of this shift have been spelled out in
detail in a number of studies, and the strategic consequences associated with
such a shift are significant as well. At precisely the time that Europe is attempting to create a common foreign policy and the means to implement it,
the continent will be set upon by a host of difficult choices whose likely resolutions will deprive Europe of the financial resources required to play a
completely independent role on the global stage.
Winter 2007-08

93

Over the next several decades, the average age of the population of
Europe will increase dramatically. According to estimates by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 46 percent of the population of Italy and
Spain and 35 percent of the population of France will be above the age of 60 in
2040.20 Based on current benefits, each retiree in Germany will have to be
supported by 1.6 workers, and each Italian and Spanish person of working age
will have to support one retiree. The consequences of this situation should not
be underestimated. Either benefits will have to be severely reduced, taxes
will have to increase, governments will have to borrow more to sustain their
aging population, or immigration will have to sharply increase in an effort to
reinforce the workforce and rebalance the population. All of those choices
have consequences that will make another near-term option more likely:
shifting resources from other government spending to shore up the pension
system. The likely candidates for cuts are the defense and international affairs
budgets. Those programs do not have domestic constituencies, and leaders
can readily enact cuts without suffering the political consequences they
would if they pursued cuts in pensions or health care benefits. 21
Thus, over the next several decades, Europe on the whole will likely
have fewer resources to devote to international affairs. The projections do not
bode well for the vision of a Europe capable of maintaining an international
presence completely autonomous from the United States. We may in fact be
seeing the peak of European military spending, developmental assistance,
and international trade. The most realistic alternative is a renewed transatlantic partnership that permits Europe to combine its specific strengths with
those of its North American allies.

Why NATO?
At the basic level, NATO is a club of democratic states. Article II of
the founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, speaks to the importance of spreading democratic values. It specifically states that the alliance will contribute to the strengthening of “free institutions, by bringing
about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions
are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.” In the
wake of the Cold War, that aspect of the alliance has gained in importance.
Every Membership Action Plan, the agreement that guides candidate countries on the path to NATO membership, includes significant sections on democratic governance, rule of law, and civilian control of the military as critical
aspects required for accession to the alliance.
More importantly, NATO has the institutional framework to assume
this role and nearly 50 years of experience in coordination, force planning, and
crisis management. Assuming this new role, in reality an expansion of its exist94
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ing mission, would entail doing many of the same things NATO does now
within a somewhat different context. NATO has a committee of military officers that advises the North Atlantic Council (the governing body of NATO
composed of the ambassadors from each member state) on military matters. It
would not be a conceptual stretch to create a civilian capability committee parallel to the military committee. This committee could advise the council on
what is necessary in terms of civilian capabilities in support of a given mission.
NATO has tremendous planning capability that can turn the political
guidance of the council into an executable plan. Again, it is possible to have a
civilian planning cell within the larger military planning structure. This cell
could be linked to the European Union’s nascent efforts in this arena. Such a
structure would unite North American and European assets for missions leveraging each member’s comparative advantage.
NATO could also contribute to a register of deployable civilian capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic. Judicial, law enforcement, and other specialized civilian personnel could be integrated into a force planning process.
NATO might also assist in the conduct of training exercises incorporating civilian, paramilitary, and military personnel. NATO has long since cataloged the
capabilities of its members and analyzed possible requirements for various contingencies. Assuming this additional role would more than likely place a strain
on an already stretched headquarters staff, but it would not be a conceptual
stretch to integrate such a capability into the existing structure.
Some might argue that these missions are not appropriate for NATO
and that the United Nations is the proper executor for stabilization and democratization missions. But the UN is based on the premise that all states regardless of their form of government are equal, be they democratic, autocratic, or a
barely functional state with limited control over the national territory. This
premise creates a fundamental contradiction: The purpose of long-term stabilization is to build sustainable democratic states, but that threatens more than a
few of the UN’s members who are considered in good standing with the assembly. An organization such as NATO does not face this contradiction. All of its
members are democracies, and their leaders have nothing to fear and everything to gain from the spread of the conditions that underpin democracy.
Thus, the United Nations can be a partner, particularly in the provision of humanitarian assistance and the coordination of some civilian capabilities, but it is not the optimal institution to execute these missions. Only an
institution such as NATO that is directly responsible to the democratically
elected leaders of its member states can maintain legitimacy in the performance of this type of mission.
This does not mean that NATO should ignore other partners. It
would be a tremendous leap in logic to assume that membership or the Article
Winter 2007-08
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V commitment of mutual defense is realistic for countries as distant as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, but there is no reason that they cannot be included in an expanded partnership. New Zealand is heavily engaged in
Afghanistan, while Japan and Australia are making significant contributions
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Clearly the interest and political will to participate in
such missions is resident in all three of those democracies, and there should
be a way to include them and others within the institutional framework of
NATO as it moves forward in its execution of stabilization and democratization missions.

Conclusion
For too long Americans have complained, with some justification,
that their European allies have not shouldered a fair share of the burden regarding mutual security. In the past the main measurement of contributions to
security was based on defense spending and the numbers of deployable
forces, but the threat has changed and so have the appropriate responses.
Many of the capabilities required to transform the current security environment that gives rise to such threats are no longer military but civilian. A better
measurement of a partner’s contributions to transatlantic security might include a range of deployable assets encompassing both military and civilian.
In the long-term it is this mix of assets that will permit the United States and
Europe to address the underlying causes of the security threats they face today and in the future. Europe has latent civilian capabilities that—if developed and included in future missions—would make NATO more balanced.
Some might see these recommendations as a plan to steal away the
European Union’s “soft power” as exemplified by its planning cell for police
actions, rule of law missions, and other traditional assistance programs. Far
from it, this is a way to use NATO as a force multiplier for these nascent capabilities. There is nothing stopping the EU from solely executing separate missions. This would be accomplished in much the same manner as France (at
first) ran its unilateral mission in the Cote d’Ivoire while still participating in
the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The EU as an institution or its member
states could still choose to execute separate operations simultaneously.
Many in Europe and in the United States will view this proposal as a
means of maintaining US hegemony and restricting Europe’s independence. 22
In fact it recalibrates the alliance to give greater standing to the specific assets
that European nations can supply. Nothing will erase the fact that the United
States remains the sole military superpower, but Europe’s choice is to either
work through a consensus-based alliance to utilize that power in support of its
security interests or to attempt to implement a completely autonomous strategy in the face of burgeoning fiscal constraints.
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The benefits to the United States are obvious, however, the most compelling reason for Europe to pursue this new path is simply a question of numbers. Europe is experiencing a long-term demographic decline, and the need to
devote more resources to sustaining the benefits of welfare states will generate
political pressure to reduce commitments for international operations. The best
chance for Europe to maintain or extend its influence in international security
affairs is to reaffirm the transatlantic partnership by way of a revamped alliance
that implicitly recognizes the value of nonmilitary contributions to stabilization and democratization missions.
Many will argue that Europe’s demographics simply highlight its irrelevancy with regard to international security affairs. Yet the specific capabilities
that Europe can bring to the table in terms of deployable law enforcement assets
and civil assistance teams will be critical to the success of long-term stabilization
and democratization missions, and are the type of capabilities the United States
may lack in sufficient quantity. Both the United States and Europe possess the
necessary capabilities to support such missions but not in sufficient numbers to
cope with the total range of long-term stabilization and democratization missions that are likely to emerge. There is a correlation between the numbers of
personnel deployed relative to the host nation’s population and the success of a
particular stabilization mission.23 In short, more is better; this equation underscores the need to have reserves of deployable personnel capable of spanning the
spectrum between “hard” and “soft” capabilities. Given the fact that Europe and
the United States have identified similar challenges to their security and already
have an established record of interoperability within NATO, the benefits of coordinating missions and combining assets should be clear.
The default option is to maintain the status quo, but the current status
quo is debilitating. It will certainly lead to an increasingly weaker Europe; a
Europe less capable of maintaining the sustained presence required to successfully execute stabilization operations. The status quo may well lead to an
increasingly frustrated United States reluctant to undertake such long-term
missions. Additionally, it may lead to missions being abandoned as soon as it
is politically possible rather than when the mission is accomplished.
The strategy outlined above is a deceptively simple proposition, but it
adds an entirely new dimension to NATO. After nearly 60 years of coordination
between member states in an effort to better cope with common threats, the alliance is the natural nexus between North America and Europe in planning for and
executing large-scale operations. Adding this improved capability to the alliance
requires a significant change in NATO. The alliance went through a similar transition in the early 1990s as it transformed itself relevant to the post-Cold War security situation in Europe. The reason NATO did not fade away after its original
raison d’etre disappeared is because it was able to transform itself from a miliWinter 2007-08
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tary alliance focused on the inter-German border to one focused on stabilizing
nations within its traditional boundaries and beyond. By once again transforming the alliance in a way that emphasizes the nonmilitary capabilities Europe has
to offer, the transatlantic partners can reforge the alliance on a more equal basis
while countering any emerging threats to their mutual security.
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